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Degnan: Evidence

Evidence
by Ronan E. Degnan*
A pleasant Chinese custom is to designate each year with
a name; the Western year 1968 is the Year of the Monkey.
In the parlance of lawyers concerned with the law of evidence, 1967 was the Year of the Statute. The truly momentous event was January 1, the effective date of the Evidence
Code. Some other statutory developments of lesser but still
substantial significance have also occurred.
This survey is concerned with case law as well as with
statutes, but the cases selected will be of primary interest
because they shed some light on how California courts are
apt to interpret the statutes. Somewhat paradoxically, this
requires some preference for dictum over holding. The clear
holdings from all but the very end of the calendar year were
applications of the old law, because the appellate courts were
still disposing of the cases that had gone to trial before
* B.S.L. 1950, LL.B. 1951, University
of Minnesota. Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. MemPublished by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

ber, Iowa, Minnesota and Utah State
Bars.
CAL LAW 1967

259

1

Cal Law Trends
and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 12
Evidence

January 1, 1967. But the appellate judges were alert to the
new Code, and frequently they would consider how they
might be required to rule if the new rather than the old law
applied. These utterances may be dicta only, but they are
more interesting than a most carefully considered decision
that was obsolete the very day on which it was decided.
Not until the very end of the year did any number of
cases actually tried under the Evidence Code come before
the courts for reported decision, and these are noted when
they seem to be significant. In a fair number of cases courts
have noted, somewhat in surprise, that the new law is not
different from the old. In nine out of ten instances, this is
the case; most of the Code merely codifies the rule as it existed
before.
Legislative Developments of 1967
Chapter 650 of the Session Laws made some technical
changes in certain sections of the Evidence Code itself. The
changes are narrow in scope, largely confirmatory in nature,
and of only occasional interest to the general practitioner.
Another legislative change is found in Chapter 262, which
conforms the terminology of the Agriculture Code on presumptions and prima facie evidence to the scheme of the
Evidence Code. l While some of these changes may prove
to have significance in the future, their general purpose was
not to amend the existing law but to correct the form of
stating it. For that reason they are only mentioned.
Quite another type of change was worked by Chapter
1509. It collects some previous sections scattered at random
through the Penal Code, amends those sections, adds some
entirely new provisions, and assembles thereby a wholly new
chapter of the Penal Code. This chapter is numbered 1.5
and is entitled Invasion of Privacy. Although found in the
Penal Code, it has an important impact upon both civil and
criminal trials, and its effect will be felt in office practice
as well as in court. It therefore warrants some description.
1. See Levy, Commercial Transactions in this volume, for similar amendments to the Commercial Code.
260
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The preamble2 recites that technology has created new
devices for the purpose of "eavesdropping upon private communications" and that the resulting "invasion of privacy" has
"created a serious threat to the free exercise of personalliber." New section 631 is former Penal Code section
ties.
640,3 but with significant change; it now provides that anyone who makes an unauthorized connection with a telephone
wire, or who, without the consent of "all parties to the communication," attempts to learn of the contents of a telephonic
communication in that manner, or who uses any information
so obtained, is guilty of a felony. Section 632 is a consolidation of former Penal Code sections 653(h)4 and (j);5 it now
provides that any person who uses electronic devices to
eavesdrop on or record a "confidential communication" without the consent of all of the parties to it is similarly guilty
of a felony. But note, this confidential communication is
not the kind of privileged confidential communication defined
and protected in the Evidence Code. 6 The term is separately
defined in the Penal Code and covers "any communication
2. Cal. Pen. Code § 630.
3. Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 571, § 1 p.
1070.
4. Cal. Stats 1941, ch. 525, § 1 p.
1833.
5. Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1886, § 1 p.
3871.
6. Cal. Evid. Code § 917 does not define confidential communication but
does establish a presumption that any
communication made in the course of
the lawyer-client, physician-patient, psychotherapist-patient, clergyman-penitent
or husband-wife relationship is confidential. Individual privileges may contain special provisions to define what is
meant by the confidential relationship
and the communications made within it.
See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 952 (confidential communication between client
and lawyer).
The rules of privileged communication prevent the person who heard the
privilege from revealing it in court, and
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he is exempted from the pressure of contempt to reveal the confidence. Nothing in the new Invasion of Privacy chapter being discussed places any party to
a conversation, no matter how confidential others expect it to be, under a requirement of silence, nor is there anything in the chapter which exempts the
parties from compulsion to reveal the
content of the "confidence" when subjected to subpoena.
Obviously, both laws could apply to
a single conversation. A lawyer who
secretly records an interview with a client is subject to Evidence Code restrictions on revealing it and probably violated the Penal Code chapter by recording it. § 636 also makes a felony of
any electronic eavesdropping or recording of conversations between a person
in police custody and his attorney, religious adviser or physician, if it be done
without the consent of ''all parties to the
conversation. "
CAL LAW 1967
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carried on in such circumstances as may reasonably indicate
that any party to such communication desires it to be confined
."7 (emphasis added)
to such parties.
In addition to the felony sanctions found in the two sections
summarized, a whole battery of remedies is made available.
No evidence obtained "as a result of eavesdropping shall be
admissible in any kind of proceeding, judicial, administrative
or legislative."8 Civil remedies are also created; an injured
person (it is not clear that the claimant need be one of the
parties to the conversation, although it does seem that only
one of those could suffer a violation of confidence) may seek
an injunction9 and can recover a minimum damage award
of at least $3,000 without proof that any actual damages have
been suffered or threatened. 10 And actual damages, if proved,
are to be trebled. l l
The potential impact of these new sections on the enforcement of the criminal law is controlled by two major exceptions.
One allows a party to a confidential communication who
reasonably believes that another party thereto will make utterances "believed to relate to the commission by another party
to such communication" of certain named offenses-extortion,
kidnaping, bribery, any felony involving violence against the
person, or the making of obscene or threatening telephone
calls-to record that communication. 12 Evidence so obtained
7. Cal. Pen. Code § 63Z(c).
8. Cal. Pen. Code § 63Z(d).
9. Cal. Pen. Code § 637.Z(b).
10. Cal. Pen. Code § 637.Z(a)(1).
11. Cal. Pen. Code § 637.Z(a)(Z).
12. Cal. Pen. Code § 633.5. The
wording of this section presents a number of problems. If one of the parties
to the conversation reasonably anticipates that another party to it will disclose evidence relating to one of the
named crimes, the making of a recording is not prohibited. This seems
enough to protect the person who records but does not obtain the reasonably
expected evidence of crime; he is not
guilty of a felony. It seems probable
262
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that the intent of the draftsmen was
only to give that protection, and to make
any other use of an innocent conversation, or one that discloses civil liability
rather than a crime, or that discloses a
crime other than one of those named,
a violation subject at least to the noncriminal sanctions of exclusion from
evidence. This suspicion seems confirmed by the language expressly admitting the evidence recorded in those prosecutions. But since the exclusion-fromevidence sanctions exclude only evidence
obtained in violation of the basic sections, it would seem that none of the
sanctions is applicable because recording on reasonable belief that the named
crimes will be disclosed is not prohib-
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(evidently either the tape itself or leads provided by it) is
expressly made admissible in prosecutions for those named
crimes. But since the making of such a recording is expressly
excepted from the basic criminal sections themselves, there
seems to be no reason why the evidence would not be admissible in any other judicial proceeding as well, nor should there
be any civil remedy or recovery because there has been no
violation of the prohibitory sections themselves.
The other major exception is a savings clause for police.
Nothing in the basic prohibitory sections themselves shall
prohibit any prosecuting attorney, member of the Highway
Patrol, sheriff or deputy regularly employed and paid, or
policeman, or any person acting at the authorized direction
of one of those named, from overhearing or recording any
communication they could lawfully have heard or recorded
prior to the effective date of the act.I3 And the preamble,
reciting a recognition of the needs of law enforcement to
employ such devices in fighting crime, declares an intention
not to place "greater restraints on the use of listening devices
and techniques by law enforcement agencies than existed"
prior to the act. I4
The major change, apart from the elaborate and awesome
penalty structure created, is found in the clearly deliberate
change from the rule that anyone party to a communication
made by wire or otherwise, could record or authorize the
recording or electronic eavesdropping on that conversation.
Under the amended law, no party can record or authorize
ited. If the purpose was to exempt
from felony sanctions recording on reasonable belief, but to allow use of the
tape only if the named crimes were disclosed and prosecution followed, it is unlikely that this result has been achieved.
Even that result would not be without problems. People v Stanley, 67
Cal.2d 837, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825, 433 P.2d
913 (1967), was a prosecution for sodomy. An investigator retained by the
defendant interviewed a principal witness, one of the victims. According to
the offer of prool, that conversation dis-
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closed an agreement between the witness
and another person "to get" the defendant; the conversation had been taped.
If the taping was without consent of
the witness, and if it disclosed a scheme
amounting to extortion, would it nevertheless be inadmissible because the prosecution was not for one of the named
crimes but for something else? If it disclosed an agreement "to get" that fell
short of extortion, would the tape be inadmissible?
13. Cal. Pen. Code § 633.
14. Cal. Pen. Code § 630.
CAL LAW 1967
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electronic eavesdropping on a communication that any other
party to it reasonably believes to be confidential.
The old law was clear enough. Prior section 653 (j)I5
allowed "any party" to consent to amplified eavesdropping
by third persons. An obvious proposition was that either
party could secretly record. The same result obtained in
wiretapping cases under old section 640 16 because of the
construction given the language in People v. Malotte: 17 "There
is no learning of the contents of a communication 'fraudulently, clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized manner'
when one of the participants to the conversation consents
to or directs its overhearing or preservation." The result
of the Malotte case may still be the law after the statute
because of the preservation of the right of the police to engage
in activity that was permitted them before the amendment.
But the reasoning of Malotte is no longer valid, since it is no
longer possible for one of the participants in a conversation
to authorize other persons to electronically eavesdrop on or
record a "confidential conversation." The rule of Malotte
protected any eavesdropper with consent; the statute now
protects only eavesdropping police.
Another development in the field of privacy during 1967
came from another source but so overlaps with the California
legislative enactment discussed above that the two must be
joined for discussion. In Katz v. United States/ 8 federal
agents had attached a recording device to the outside of a
public telephone booth. They overheard and recorded what
Katz said to confederates in Miami and in Boston, and then
used his words to convict him of transmitting wagering information over a wire communication facility in interstate commerce, a federal felony. The agents were scrupulous to hear
and record only what Katz said, and thus they avoided violation of the Federal Communications Act prohibition against
intercepting and divulging the telephonic communication
itself. They thought that they had also avoided violation
15. Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1886, § 1 p.
3871.
16. Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 571, § 1 p.
1070.
264
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17. 46 Cal.2d at 64, 292 P.2d at 520
(1956).
18. - U.S. - , 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 88
S.Ct. 507 (1967).
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of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure. The Supreme Court held that they had
not-words as well as things can be seized. Overruling
Olmstead v. United States,!9 the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places, and thus the absence
of a common-law trespass (either because the agents did not
penetrate the booth itself, or because it was a public booth,
which they as well as Katz lawfully could enter) did not
matter.
The extent of the overlap between the federal development
discussed here and the California legislation should not be
minimized by the fact that a telephone booth was involved.
It was the entering of the enclosure, which was reasonably
thought to be private and free from intrusion, that brought
the Fourth Amendment into play. Had Katz and his confederate crowded into the booth and exchanged their information orally, but without use of the telephone at all they
would equally have been entitled to be free from electronic
or even unaided eavesdropping.20
In civil cases, the potential of the statutory development
reaches at least some aspects of law office operation. Many
a telephone conversation is routinely recorded without explicit warning to the other party that a recorder is operating.
Investigators, and even clients themselves, are instructed to
record conversations with potential witnesses, often without
giving any warning and sometimes with active concealment
of that fact. A not unusual practice in divorce cases is to
have one spouse induce the other to make admissions of
matters such as infidelity under express or implied assurances
of confidence.
All of these practices are now at least suspect and dangerous. While it seems still to be the law that any party to
a conversation, telephonic or not, may testify to what he and
others said unless the contents are made privileged by the
19. 277 u.s. 438, 72 L.Ed. 944, 48
S.Ct. 564, 66 A.L.R. 376 (1928).
20. The refinement of the impact of
this particular piece of 1967 legislation
on enforcement of the criminal law is

relegated to the companion article on
criminal law and criminal procedure.
The same is true of the Fourth Amendment developments of the Katz case.
CAL LAW 1967
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Evidence Code, no person is entitled to bolster his credibility
as a witness by producing a clandestine tape that confirms
his version. A witness may still be impeached by the showing of prior inconsistent statements made, or a party confronted with his previous admissions, even if he was unaware
that he was being overheard at the time he made the statement. But the making of the statement cannot be proved
by a clandestine tape recording, or recounted orally by one
who overheard it through the use of amplifying devices,
whether or not it was simultaneously recorded.
The very employment of the recording or amplifying device
is what is dangerous. The sanction is not merely that the
recorded words will be refused admission. The person who
offers the prohibited recording is guilty of a felony, as is the
person who made it. If the prosecutor proves to be uninterested in the offense, the civil action for a minimum damage
award of $3,000 is a threat within the control of the private
party without prosecutorial aid.
It would seem that a minimum precaution to be taken by
those who make such recordings would be an announcement
heard on the tape itself that the conversation is being recorded, with some acknowledgment of that fact by the other
party or parties thereto.! On the other side, a cross-examiner
confronted with oral testimony about a conversation had
between the witness and others might well inquire whether
the conversation had been recorded.
A word of conjecture about the future of the Invasion
of Privacy chapter may be in order. No doubt the draftsmen
intended to achieve a significant change in the law. Whether
their full hopes will be realized may be doubted, however;
the combination of very vague and ambiguous drafting with
1. On this point as well, the new legislation is very vague. § 632(c), defining confidential communications, emphasizes the desire of any party to the
communication that it be confidential.
Mere knowledge that it is being recorded does not necessarily refute the
266
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guilty of violating, specifically "excludes
an individual known by all parties to a
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a system of most extreme penalties available at the instigation
of any person who thinks himself wronged will in all probability lead to judicial constructions confining the impact of
the legislation to the narrowest and clearest violations.
The Evidence Code Itself
As indicated, the legislative changes in the Evidence Code
worked by the 1967 legislature are of a static nature. Some
part of them may ultimately prove to be of significance, but
that is not now predictable. More important is what happened during the year in early judicial anticipation of the
Code and of later application of its terms.
Effective Date
Section 12 of the Code provides that it shall become operative on January 1, 1967, and shall govern proceedings in
actions brought on or after that date. Predictably, the challenge has already been raised that making the new rules
of admissibility, more liberal than existed when the offense
occurred, applicable to a crime committed before the effective
date is a violation of provisions against retroactivity when
used against a defendant.
It might be thought that this will be a burning problem for
a short time under the Code but will decline quickly because
cases of older vintage will soon disappear. This is doubtless
true of civil actions. But as to them, the claim of unconstitutionally retrospective application seems too frail to warrant serious consideration. It is as to criminal cases, and
the proscription against ex post facto legislation, that the
contention is serious. And it arises not merely in the carryover of calendars pending at the end of 1966. Criminal
convictions are more often reversed for new trials than are
civil judgments. Further, the availability of habeas corpus
and other modes of collateral attack make probable the holding of a new criminal trial not merely a few months after
the effective date of the Code but also long after, for crimes
committed years before that date.
CAL LAW 1967
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People v. lohnson 2 is such a case. Defendant had been
convicted of incest. The exact time sequence is not revealed
in the opinion, but the grand jury indictment was returned
in February 1964. The ensuing conviction was vacated by
a United States District Court in July 1966. The new trial
in the state court commenced on January 24, 1967, and the
trial judge applied the Code. The result was an admission
of hearsay evidence that would not have been admissible if
the trial had commenced a month before, and that could
not have been received at the time of the alleged offense (J anuary 1964) or at any prompt trial time thereafter.
The case presents the issue in very stark form. As will
be demonstrated in discussion of the substantive hearsay question of this case, no conviction could have resulted without
the evidence newly made admissible by the Code. An advised
verdict of acquittal would have been mandatory.
The case was well briefed and carefully decided, and it
resulted in a sustaining of the conviction over the ex post facto
objection. Obviously the last word lies with a higher court,
possibly with the Supreme Court of the United States.
The defendant urged, and the court of appeal primarily considered cases decided in that court. Prime among them was
Calder v. Bull,3 and the quoted language, although dictum,
seems applicable; ex post facto laws include "every law that
alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender."
But subsequent decisions have indicated that the essential
protection of the ex post facto clause is against imparting
criminality to conduct not criminal when it was engaged in,
or increasing the punishment for what was then a lesser offense. It does not preclude reception of evidence from a
source that was statutorily kept silent at the time of the
conduct now charged. If a witness not competent to testify
at the time of the charged conduct can be made competent
by subsequent legislation, as the Supreme Court in Hopt
2. 257 Cal. App.2d 655, 64 Cal. Rptr.
875 (1967), hearing in California Supreme Court granted February 21, 1968.
268
CAL LAW 1967

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/12

3. 3 U.S. (3 DaIl.) at 390, 1 L.Ed. at
650 (1798).

10

Evidence

Degnan: Evidence

v. Utah,4 it would seem even more clear that the previously
inadmissible hearsay of a witness can be given the effect
of substantive evidence of guilt rather than for mere impeachment. The opinion in People v. Johnson so holds, by rejecting
the ex post facto objection.
The court of appeal did not consider a somewhat related
constitutional objection, which is that the reception of hearsay
may violate the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal accused
to confront the witnesses against him. This is a ground not
connected with the effective date of the Evidence Code, and
it may invalidate the use of hearsay that was admissible under
the old law, as well as some made newly admissible by the
Evidence Code. It seems sufficient to note that in Johnson,
unlike the situation presented by Douglas v. Alabama,5 the
accused did have opportunity at trial to examine the witnesses
upon the content of their prior testimony before the grand
jury. The opinion does not indicate that he made any effort
to do so, and hence there was no showing that the witnesses
might have invoked a privilege or otherwise refused to answer
when questioned about their own prior statements, as they
did in Douglas. At worst, one of the witnesses in Johnson
testified that she could not recall the events described in one
of the prior statements attributed to her. This was on direct
examination; had she made the same disclaimer on crossexamination, a more tenable claim of ineffective opportunity
to cross-examine, and hence a denial of the right to confront,
would have been presented.
The record in Johnson thus did not directly present a confrontation claim. Cases still developing under the Code will
raise that question and call for a decision. An attorney
should be alert to the possibility that any of the hearsay
4. 110 U.S. 574, 28 L.Ed. 262, 4 S.
Ct. 202 (1884).
5. 380 u.s. 415, l3 L.Ed.2d 934, 85
S.Ct. 1074 (1965). The witness, allegedly with the accused when the crime
was committed, invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination and gave no
testimony. Under the guise of impeachment, the prosecutor read the prior writ-

ten statement of the witness, sentence by
sentence, to the witness in front of the
jury. When asked if he had made each
of the statements, the witness again invoked the privilege. Since the witness
had given no testimony, and refused
to answer questions, cross-examination
seemed futile.
CAL LAW 1967
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exceptions that were newly created or substantially enlarged
by the Evidence Code contain the potential for violation of
the confrontation right if they effectively limit the opportunity
for cross-examination. What was lacking in Johnson was a
demonstration by questioning that cross-examination was
rendered impossible or ineffective.
Witnesses
The Code purports to work a number of changes, most of
them minor, in the rules regulating examination and crossexamination of witnesses. The most prominent of the cases
decided on the point is People v. Stanley.6 The defendant
was charged with sodomy committed with two young boys,
one 10 years old and another 14. The 10-year-old gave
very precise testimony about the occasion charged and other
occasions not charged, and about offenses committed both
with himself and with other boys. Because of grave doubts
about this testimony, the supreme court found ground for
reversal under the pre-1967 law. Reversal was based largely
upon the "other crimes" evidence, and represents nothing
new.
More important is the fact that the trial judge had compounded that error by refusing to hear even an offer of proof
to the effect that an investigator retained by defendant had
interviewed the 14-year-old and obtained statements to the
effect that the two boys had made an agreement "to get" the
defendant. Because the judge refused to hear the offer on
the ground that it was hearsay, the precise content of the
conversation was not revealed. The supreme court held that
it would be admissible for the purpose of impeachment on
retrial.
The prosecution did not dismiss the counts relating to the
14-year-old, but neither did it offer him as a witness. Defendant's motion to dismiss charges as to this boy were denied,
but the court did dismiss the boy as a prosecution witness.
This left it to defendant to decide whether to call the boy
6. 67 Cal.2d 837, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825,
433 P.2d 913 (1967).
270
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to the stand. The trial judge indicated that calling him would
amount to an adoption by the defendant of the boy's testimony, under the time-honored rule that calling the boy made
him "your own witness." Defendant did call the boy, daring
to ask only two questions, and the prosecutor did not crossexamine.
All of the new law of this case is found in a footnote,7
which is more important for the future than the longer opinion
stated in the text. The Code abolishes 8 the rule applied by
the trial judge which bound the party to the testimony of
his own witness, or which at least prevented impeachment by
the party calling the witness unless both surprise and damage
could be shown. Thus the trial judge, although right at the
time of trial, would be in error if he were to rule the same
way at the new trial.
There are two questions the court did not expressly consider
in this significant footnote. First, the tape recording might
be an independently inadmissible item because of the Penal
Code sections treated above, depending of course upon the
conditions under which it was made and the time at which
it was made. Second, the court did not consider the independent evidence effect of the prior statement of the 14-yearold under the enlarged hearsay exceptions of the new Code.
The first of these problems has already been discussed. The
second seems next in order here.
Hearsay Enlargements
The Stanley case displays the operative effect of making
prior statements of a witness an exception to the hearsay
rule rather than merely impeaching testimony. Continuing
the prior law, the Code defines as hearsay any statement
"made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing
and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated."9
Under that definition, the investigator's testimony about what
the 14-year-old disclosed about the agreement "to get" the
7. 67 Cal.2d at 841 n. 1, 63 Cal. Rptr.
at 827 n. 1, 433 P.2d at 913 n. 1.
8. Cal. Evid. Code § 785: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked or

supported by any party including the
party calling him."
9. Cal. Evid. Code § 1200(a).
CAL LAW 1967
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defendant would indeed be hearsay. Under the old law, it
would be admissible only to impeach the 14-year-old's testimony-if he gave any. It would not be evidence of such
an agreement, and above all it would not discredit the very
explicit and precise testimony of the 10-year-old. The
jury would be instructed accordingly, and defense counsel
would not use the testimony of the investigator for any purpose other than to discredit the 14-year-old.
The Code result, although not discussed in the opinion,
would be very different. There would have to be compliance
with section 770. 10 That is, the 14-year-old would have to be
confronted with his alleged prior inconsistent statement and
given opportunity to explain it, or at least he should not be
excused from further attendance before the investigator testified. Given that assurance of opportunity to cross-examine
the boy, the prior statements could be shown if they were
"inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing.
,,11
Given inconsistency, not shown in the record in
Stanley because the prosecutor asked no questions of the
boy and the defendant dared not ask any under the law
governing at that time, the prior statement would be admissible as substantive evidence despite its hearsay character.
It would be evidence of an agreement "to get" the defendant,
made not merely by the 14-year-old but also by the 10-yearold, whose destructive evidence had already been received.
It may be argued that the only practical change is in the
admissibility of the evidence of prior statement. The jury
(or even a judge without a jury) probably would not limit
the prior statement to impeachment but would consider the
10. Cal. Evid. Code § 770: "Evidence of inconsistent statement of witness. Unless the interests of justice
otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of
a statement made by a witness that is
inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be excluded
unless:
(a) The witness was so examined
while testifying as to give him an opportunity to explain or to deny the statement; or
l72
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(b) The witness has not been excused
from giving further testimony in the action."
11. Cal. Evid. Code § 1235: "Evidence of a statement made by a witness
is not made inadmissible by the hearsay
rule if the statement is inconsistent with
his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770."
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full substantive significance of the proved agreement, not
merely to discredit the 14-year-old but to disbelieve the
10-year-old as well. Perhaps so, although there is always
the possibility that a jury will at least attempt to follow
instructions. Speculations about the judge are less tenable,
for in this case he refused even to hear what the investigator
would say because of its hearsay character. Even if judges
and jurors will often ignore the law, there is still significance
to the change from mere impeachment to substantive evidence. The judge must hear the evidence; he can no longer
instruct the jury that it is only impeachment and not evidence.
Above all, counsel can now argue to the jury that they should
believe the prior story, not merely that they should refuse
to credit the sworn but inconsistent tale told on the witness
stand.
Even those who scoff at all these changes as being merely
formal rather than real can hardly ignore what happens
when the circumstances are reversed and the hearsay favors
the prosecution rather than the accused. Section 1235 was
also involved in People v. lohnson,12 mentioned above. Johnson was charged by grand jury indictment with incest with
his teen-aged daughter. At the 1967 trial, both the daughter
and the mother gave testimony that, at very worst, indicated
astonishing familiarity between father and daughter but which
could not sustain a finding of intercourse; the daughter denied
it had occurred, and the mother had never observed any
impropriety at all.
The opinion does not reveal direct testimony from any
other source that could have served to establish even suspicion of intercourse. In the nature of such things, there seldom
will be outside observers. Both mother and daughter had,
however, told the grand jury of specific details of intercourse
that had occurred not merely once but many times, both in
the presence of the mother and while she was absent. The
grand jury transcript showing this testimony might have been
admissible under the pre-1967 law to impeach the present
12. 257 Cal. App.2d 655, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 875 (1967), hearing in California
18

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

Supreme Court granted February 21,
1968.
CAL LAW 1967
273

15

Cal Law Trends
and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 12
Evidence

relatively innocent testimony of the two;13 it could have shown
that they lied when they denied intercourse, but it could not
have served as affirmative evidence that intercourse had occurred.
Fully recognizing this distinction, the court of appeal held
that Evidence Code section 1235 gives substantive effect
to the prior grand jury testimony by making it evidence that
intercourse had occurred on the charged date. Further, the
conviction appears to rest on these prior statements alone.
Most of the prior statements admitted were made before
the grand jury. As a consequence, it can be assumed that
they were made under oath, but any cross-examination that
might have occurred was not by the defendant himself. Under
existing practice, the proceeding is not adversary. This has
significance only to distinguish another and very distinct hearsay exception, that of recorded prior testimony. In the Johnson case there had been a prior trial and conviction. Proffer
of the sworn testimony of the two principal witnesses as
recorded at that prior trial would be governed by quite distinct
principles stated in great detail in section 1291. The important difference to be noted is that the prior trial testimony is
receivable because the defendant had an opportunity to crossexamine at that time, which may warrant receipt against him
of the transcript even if he has no opportunity to cross-examine
at the present trial. He could not cross-examine before the
grand jury, and his right to confront the daughter and wife
may well be deemed to turn upon his present effective right
to cross-examine them about their grand jury testimony.
The testimony of daughter and mother might have taken
two lines very different from what actually occurred. Suppose
the mother testified that she had no knowledge or recollection
of the events at all. Would her grand jury testimony then
have been "inconsistent with" her testimony at the second
trial? This nearly occurred in another proof item offered,
the testimony, by another witness, that the mother had related
13. The prosecutor having called the
women, they were "his witnesses" under
the old law. But if he succeeded in persuading the judge that he was both sur274
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prised by their change of testimony and
damaged by what they said on the stand,
the impeachment could be permitted.
See Comment to Cal. Evid. Code § 785.
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to the witness some of the same complaints about the conduct
of the defendant. The opinion does not directly consider
whether inconsistency can be found in memory matched
against lack of memory, or whether it requires contradiction.
The court said merely that "this exception to the hearsay rule
should apply in order to fully ascertain the truth of the matter.,,14 Although hardly an explanation, the ruling seems correct. The Code speaks of inconsistency, not contradiction.
The other and much more speCUlative line of testimony by
mother and daughter would have been to refuse to testify
upon grounds of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Whether such a privilege claim would be sustained is not
clear; the opinion does not reveal whether there was any risk
of prosecution against them. If they had, rightly or wrongly
but nevertheless successfully, claimed the privilege, the claim
of lack of the constitutional right to confrontation would have
assumed serious proportions. But the argument perhaps need
not ascend to the constitutional level. Is a claim of privilege
"testimony" at all within the meaning of section 1235? If
it is not, and it seems very doubtful that refusal to testify
can be the equivalent of testimony, there seems to be nothing
with which the prior statement can be deemed to be inconsistent. This argument, then, is that the prior statement
remains, as it always was, hearsay. Because this newly created exception does not apply, the argument continues, the
grand jury testimony is not admissible.
A new hearsay exception found in the Evidence Code and
without prior history in California is section 1300:
Evidence of a final judgment adjudging a person guilty
of a crime punishable as a felony is not made inadmissible
by the hearsay rule when offered in a civil action to prove
any fact essential to the judgment unless the judgment
was based on a plea of nolo contendere.
How it may work can be illustrated by two cases decided during the year. In O'Conner v. O'Leary15 a theater patron had
14. 257 Cal. App.2d at 664, 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 882.
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been killed in an affray with O'Leary, an employee of the
theater owner. O'Conner's heirs sued for his wrongful death,
joining O'Leary and his employer. Prior to the trial O'Leary
had been convicted of felony manslaughter, and plaintiffs
offered proof of this as collateral estoppel against him under
the doctrine of Teitelbaum v. Dominion Insurance CO. 16 The
court of appeal held exclusion to be proper; although ordinarily conclusive against O'Leary alone, admitting the
conviction as to O'Leary would also bring it before the
jury as to the employer as well, working prejudice to the
employer's interests. And there would be no realization of
judicial economy by avoiding trial of the issue of cause of
death, because that issue had to be tried against the employer
in any event.
The decision is a careful treatment of the problem, and was
probably the correct decision at the time it was made. The
Code section quoted above would seem to require a different
result today. Since the felony conviction would now be admissible against the employer, he cannot be saved from the
"prejudice" of having the jury hear about it. And there is
no reason why the conviction would not be given its full
collateral estoppel effect against the employee, although allowed only as evidence effective against the employer. An
explanation of this distinction is that O'Leary had prior opportunity to defend himself on the charge and failed, but that
the employer had no such opportunity.
The first case actually applying section 1300 did expose
a little difficulty in judicial handling, however. People v.
One 1964 Chevroletl7 was a proceeding to forfeit an automobile because the registered owner had entrusted it to his
son, who had knowingly possessed and transported contraband narcotics in the automobile. The son was tried and
convicted, in a jury trial, of felony possession of marijuana.
He testified in the forfeiture proceeding that he had no knowledge of the presence of the drug. The trial judge allowed
of this case, see Weiner, Civil Procedure in this volume.
16. 58 Ca1.2d 601, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559,
375 P.2d 439 (1962).
276
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receipt of the felony conviction as evidence that the son did
know of its presence. After a verdict for defendants, the
judge granted a new trial on several grounds, two of them
having to do with the felony conviction. The first of these
was that he should have ruled that the conviction was conclusive on the point of knowledge. On this the trial judge was
clearly wrong. It was evidence only against the owner, who
had no previous opportunity to contest that point because
he was not a party to the criminal conviction. The court of
appeal so held.
The second ground is closely connected; the judge also
thought that he erred in permitting the owner's counsel to
argue to the jury that the felony conviction was wrong because
the jury had rendered "inconsistent verdicts," had "undeniably" compromised its verdicts in acquitting on some counts
and convicting on only one, and had violated oaths in not
"applying the doctrine of reasonable doubt." The court of
appeal opinion is unsatisfactory on this point. It appears to
agree with the trial judge's self-assigned error. If the conviction is only evidence, and it is no more than that under section
1300, it is not sacrosanct evidence that cannot be questioned
or contradicted. As with any other hearsay, it is subject
to question on the reliability of the out-of-court declaranthere the criminal jury. This is especially true when the issue is
credibility. If the forfeiture jury believed the boy's denial of
knowledge, can they be required to yield to the criminal
jury's contrary conclusion that he lied? A holding that they
must comes perilously close to denial of due process to the
owner, as well as denial of a right to jury trial on a contested
issue of fact.
Although section 1300 of the Evidence Code has relaxed
the former prohibition against the use in evidence of felony
convictions, the limitation contained in the language implies
that misdemeanor convictions must still be excluded. Recognizing this distinction, Rousseau v. West Coast House
Movers 18 rightly held that it was improper to receive evidence
18. 256 Cal. App.2d 989, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 655 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

277

19

Evidence
Cal Law Trends
and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 12

of three convictions for misdemeanor drunk driving, which
were evidently offered to show that plaintiff had not lost his
capacity to drive as a consequence of the injuries claimed.
Although finding the error not prejudicial in the circumstances, the correct rule was stated. 19
The court did find its ruling on that point somewhat
anomalous when compared to another hearsay decision it
made in the same case. It approved reception of some twenty
police arrest reports which recited the names of the arresting
officers, the times and places of arrests, and that plaintiff
was "drunk on sidewalk" or "unable to care for self." Some
contained an admission to drinking beer or whiskey.
Since the prime injury claimed was that the injury had transformed a sober, reliable worker into an irrational alcoholic,
evidence of arrests for drunkenness dating prior to the date
of injury must have had a very telling effect. The court
found that these records were admissible under the Business
Records Act, which is continued substantially unchanged from
its pre-Code form.20 The court found it "somewhat illogical"
to admit the arrest reports while excluding the misdemeanor
convictions. But again the ruling seems correct. The reports
gave every appearance of being made on first-hand knowledge
and observation of the officer making the report, and did not
contain what is so usual in accident investigation reportsthe unchecked hearsay of unknown witnesses who have no
duty to make honest or accurate reports. But this is only
an assumption made from the face of the records themselves.
If it is necessary to summon as a witness the arresting officer
so that he can testify that the entries are his own observation
19. Another possible distinction to be
drawn, perhaps misleading, is that the
section is confined to civil actions, suggesting that convictions may not be received in criminal cases. It has long
been the rule that in those limited circumstances in which prior crimes are
provable in a criminal case, the fact
that the prior crime was committed may
be proved by the judgment of conviction. In People v. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d
278
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459, 58 Cal. Rptr. 107, 426 P.2d 507
(1967), the supreme court faced for the
first time the question of what effect
should be given to a judgment of acquittal. Noting that the effect of the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt
made the effect of acquittal less convincing, the court nevertheless held that the
fact of acquittal was admissible, leaving
the question of its weight to the jury.
20. Cal. Evid. Code § 1271.
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rather than second-hand knowledge, as some cases suggest,
the utility of the Business Records Act is sharply restricted.
If the arrest reports are old, the arresting officer may be
unavailable or, more likely, without any present memory of
the event at all.
A final hearsay case of significance decided during the year
was Markley v. Beagle which purported to be under the old
law but which in fact anticipated the new Code, and the
supreme court so declared. 1 It is unlike the other cases discussed in that the ruling was against rather than in favor of
admissibility. Markley was injured when he went to the
roof of a building to service an exhaust fan. Among the
defendants he sued were the contractors who allegedly had
removed and replaced a guardrail. In support of this claim,
Markley offered proof that one of the employees of the contractors said, long after the alleged removal and after his
employment with them had ended, that workmen employed
by the contractors had removed and replaced the rail. Because of the lapse of time there could be no spontaneous
utterance, and, because the employment had ceased, the statement could not have been made within the scope of authority.
Markley was thus driven to reliance on Evidence Code section
1224:
When the liability . . . of a party to a civil action
is based in whole or in part upon the liability .
of the declarant, . . . evidence of a statement made
by the declarant is as admissible against the party as
it would be if offered against the declarant in an action
involving that liability. . . .
Substitute the words "contractor" for "party to a civil action"
and "employee" for "declarant," and the argument seems
compelling.
The court in Markley agreed that the language was susceptible to an interpretation that would render the employee's
statement admissible. Although the case could be distin1. Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal.2d 951,
59 Cal. Rptr. 809, 429 P.2d 129 (1967).
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guished, in that the employee had not made any statement
that disclosed that he personally had removed the railing,
but said only that some employees of the contractor had, the
court did not postpone decision. It held that Code of Civil
Procedure section 1851,2 the progenitor of Evidence Code
section 1224, did not apply to cases of this kind. Despite
the apparent meaning, that application had not been given to
the section during the nearly 100 years the statute had been
in existence. Unless the statement of the employee qualifies
as an excited utterance3 or so exposes him to prospective
liability that it may be received as a declaration against interest, 4 it must meet the more stringent agency test of being a
statement the employee was authorized to make. 5 It is not
enough that it was a statement made about acts the employee
was authorized to do.
Evidence Code-Presumptions
The large attention given in this article to hearsay changes
probably is predictive of the future as well. Most of the
Code innovations are in the hearsay area. Another field in
which difficulty is certain to arise, because important changes
have been made there as well, is that of presumptions. The
cases have not yet arrived for clarification, but one that does
suggest the character of the problems that will be encountered
is Albers v. Owens. 6 As with some others noted here, the
case was tried before the effective date of the Code but the
supreme court, in reversing, ventured an observation on the
law to be applied at retrial. The defense was contributory
negligence. Plaintiff offered evidence that he suffered from
retrograde amnesia, thus invoking the so-called presumption
of due care that has played so large a role in these cases.
The opinion says, "This presumption had been held to be evi2. Ca1. Stats. 1945, ch. 1292,
2425.
3. Cal. Evid. Code § 1240.
4. Cal. Evid. Code § 1230.
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that § 1224 might extend to such cases,
seems discredited by the supreme court
holding in Markley, which was not
known at the time LeMire was decided.

S. Ca1. Evid. Code § 1222. The suggestion of LeMire v. Lyman, 250 Cal.
App.2d 799, 58 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1967),
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dence in itself sufficient to forestall a nonsuit based on contributory negligence."7 Since the opinion had already ruled
that a jury issue was presented, the court merely observed that
"on retrial it is clear that such a presumption would not have
the effect of evidence."g The citation is to Evidence Code
section 600 (a), which expressly so declares.
The question not discussed is whether the so-called presumption of due care any longer exists or can have any
operative effect. It is not listed among the presumptions
classified as affecting the burden of producing evidence9 nor
is it found in the list of those that affect the burden of proof. 10
The reason for omission is not oversight. Under the Code
scheme, the maximum effect a presumption can have is to
shift the burden of proof to the person against whom the
presumption operates (sometimes aptly called the "victim"
of the presumption). Since the defendant already bears the
burden of proving contributory negligence, there is little procedural role that the presumption of due care can any longer
play.
This is not to say, however, that the old wisdom that was
incorporated in the discredited presumption is also repealed.
While an attorney can no longer argue to the jury that there
is "evidence" of due care, he can appeal to the common sense
of the jurors by invoking their own realization that people
do in fact have a high incentive to look out for their own
safety, and as such the jury can reason that plaintiff did act
accordingly.
Conclusion

A critical reader may say that many of the statements
found herein are more conjecture than projection. That is
conceded. At the end of the first full year of experience
under the Evidence Code, we know scarcely more about it
7.
123,
8.
124,

66 Cal.2d at 799, 59 Cal. Rptr. at
427 P.2d at 787.
66 Ca1.2d at 800, 59 Cal. Rptr. at
427 P.2d at 788.

9. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 631-645.
10. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 661-668.
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than we did at the beginning. One observation can be made,
however, that tells something about the Code's probable future. The appellate decisions have embraced the new law with
near enthusiasm rather than doubt and hostility. This indicates willing acceptance of at least its general provisions.
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